Not only Nso, what is not said about the Pegasus case by Alberto Negri

The post by Alberto Negri, already foreign correspondent to the Sole 24 Ore, on the Pegasus case Client states of the NSO buy Pegasus to monitor political opponents and the population. But since its creation in 2011, the Israeli company has been selling its software as a tool intended solely for the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and ensures that it takes every precaution to ensure "legitimate" use of its program. On the other hand, the analysis of the data shows that the fight against crime constitutes a small part of the use of Pegasus. In Hungary, Azerbaijan, Morocco, Rwanda the targets are mainly journalists, opponents, lawyers, human rights defenders. The NSO has been repeating for years that political surveillance cases are isolated incidents, in reality abuses are the norm not the exception. The problem is that the Israeli government cannot ignore it. The supply to some governments has helped restore thorny diplomatic relations. The activities of the NSO may partly explain - together with military agreements - the well-known Abrahamic Pact with some Gulf monarchies (Emirates and Bahrain) and the recent rapprochement of the Jewish state with Saudi Arabia, which Pegasus has used to control the family of Jamal Khashoggi, the opposition journalist tortured and killed in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul by Prince Mohammed bin Salman, defined by Renzi as a sort of "Renaissance prince". Pegasus also facilitated relations between Israel, Hungary and Morocco. Neither the NSO nor the Israeli government can ignore the fact that most customers buy Pegasus to monitor political opponents, for the industrial espionage of commercial partners, and to investigate private individuals and governments in neighboring countries. International law only partially frames the sale of these cyber weapons while the Nso Group firmly denies the allegations. But the evidence seems consistent. And disturbing. Pegasus is not a simple "telephone listening" tool. Effective and powerful, the spy software can collect all the data contained in a device, from photographs to the address book to messages exchanged on theoretically secure applications such as Signal or Whatsapp. Invisible to the phone user, the software can be installed remotely (without the "target" needing to open a link) by exploiting the security holes in Apple and Google software. The NSO software then feeds the hacker market, prompting hundreds of them to constantly search for new vulnerabilities and then sell their findings to the NSO and a handful of other companies. The most cynical - whoever writes as a war correspondent has had the telephone checked here and abroad dozens of times - will think that this is a common practice in relations between states. However, these investigations reveal a vast digital surveillance system that goes far beyond the framework of the "normal" spy game. (Extract from a post published on Alberto Negri's Facebook profile)